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EQUITABLE EJECTMENT*
Since the New York Code of 18481 abolished the distinctions, be-
tween actions at law and suits in equity and the forms of all such actions
and suits, the title of this paper may seem somewhat paradoxical.
Nevertheless, a few dicta to the contrary,2 one who sues for.the posses-
sion of realty is still objectionable if he has only an "equitable" title,
because, it is said, so slight an interest will not support "ejectment."
In view of the courts' use of the words, we have ventured to combine
them here as a general description of the plight of the so-called equit-
able owner as he sues for his land in so-called ejectment.
In some jurisdictions statutes expressly provide that he may sue. 4
Where this legislation is not in effect, most courts answer him as crisply
as did a New York judge thirty-five years ago: "The rule given by
Chitty5 prevails in this state. 'The lessor of the plaintiff must also have
a strict legal right; a mere equitable and beneficial interest, without the
legal title, will not suffice.' ,, The same statement was made by the
Court of Appeals so recently as last May in Trembarth v. Berner.7
Nor has the present benevolent attitude toward defendants hold-
ing equitable titles been of assistance to plaintiffs similarly situated.
If an equitable owner once gets into possession, the legal owner cannot
dislodge him; his equitable title is a defense.8  But if the equitable
owner has not the luck or the foresight to get possession legally" by
himself he may have difficulty in getting it from the courts, for an equit-
able title will not support ejectment. Some courts have perceived the
* A paper read before the Section on Remedies, Associations of American
Law Schools, December 30, 1925, Chicago, Ill.1 Sec. 62;' see also N. Y. Code Civ. Proc. § 3339; N. Y. C. P. A. § 8.
'This discussion is concerned with the law of code states only and has no
reference to the special proceedings permitted in some states and known as
equitable ejectment. See Bouldin v. Taylor (Tex. 1925) 275 S. W. 340.
Gonella v. Simmons (1909) 10 Calif. App. 257, 101 Pac. 685; Whitehead v.
Callahan (1908) 44 Colo. 396, 99 Pac. 57; Brown v. Hutchinson (1911) 155 N.
C. 205, 71 S. E. 302.
" See e.g., Kan. Rev. Stat. 60-2001; Tucker v. Immanuel Baptist Church(Kan. 1925) 237 Pac. 654; Johanson v. Washington (1902) 190 U. S. 179, 23
Sup. Ct. 825, citing Ballinger's Code § § 5500, 5508; Laughlin v. Fariss (1897)
7 Okla. 1, 50 Pac. 254, citing Code Civ. Proc. § 614, based on Kansas statute.
see also Knite v. Lage (1908) 152 Mich. 638, 116 N. W. 467, construing Mich.
Comp. Laws (1915) § 10949.
'1 Chitty, Pleading (16th Am. ed.) *212.
Townshend v. Frommer (1889) 25 N. Y. St. R. 358, 365.(1925) 240 N. Y. 617, 148 N. E. 729.
' Crary v. Goodman (1855) 12 N. Y. 266; Lombard v. Cowham (1874) 34
Wis. 486. Cf. Kirk v. Hamilton (1880) 102 U. S. 68. See Hinton, Equitable De-fenses under Modern Codes (1920) 18 Mich. Law Rev. 717.
EQUITABLE EJECTMENT
anomaly. Witness the frank language of a Missouri judge: "The
general rule is that a plaintiff may not recover in a strictly legal action
like ejectment on an equitable title, although a defendant in ejectment
by virtue of our Code Pleading may plead an equitable defense, so that
if the boot were on the other foot an entirely different case would be
presented."' 1  One may be permitted to ask why our Code Pleading
imputes greater virtue to defendants than plaintiffs, and what funda-
mental differences there are after all between the respective boots and
feet.
Apparently in the dissolution of the old procedure, which in many
cases against their will" engulfed them, the courts clung to one firm
and solid rock: "the rule given by Chitty." Here, at least, they seem to
have said, is something which is preserved to us: an equitable title will
not support ejectment. In enforcing equitable claims in personalty
much the same question is presented. 2 But ejectment has been a magic
word, one justifying a return in this instance to those vanished forms
andotechnicalities whose disappearance in other cases had been so much
lamented.
The problem has the following three aspects: First, is the equitable
owner the real party in interest in a suit for possession? Second, has
the union of law and equity abolished a separate action of ejectment?
Third, can an equitable owner sue for his land without a jury trial?
The usual jury trial statutes use two methods of labeling this kind of
case. One is to provide that issues of fact in actions for the possession
of specific realty, are to be tried to the jury.13 The other is the method
used in New York, where the same result is reached by saying that in
an action of ejectment issues of fact mustbe tried by a jury and then
'That the equitable title is not a defense if possession was secured by force,
see Schick v. Wolf (1924) 207 App. Div. 652, 202 N. Y. Supp. 601.
"Martin v. Kitchen (1906) 195 Mo. 477, 93 S. W. 780. See also Pomeroy,
Code Remedies (4th ed. 1904) 59. As to equitable defenses generally see the
article by Professor Cook, Equitable Defences (1923) 32 Yale Law Journ. 645.
'See Reubens v. Joel (1856) 13 N. Y. 488; Goulet v. Asseler (1860) 22
N. Y. 225. Cf. N. Y. Ice Co. v. Northweste-n Ins. Co. (1861) 23 N. Y. 357;
McArthur v. Moffett (1910) 143 Wis. 564, 567, 128 N. W. 445. Clark, The
Union of Law and Equity (1925) 25 Columbia Law Rev. 1.
' See Wheeler v. Allen (1872) 51 N. Y. 37; Richmond Foundry Co. v.
Carter (1916) 133 Tenn. 489, 182 S. W. 240; cf. Kingsland v. Chrisman (1887)
28 Mo. App. 308.
'See, e.g., Calif. Code Civ. Proc. (1923) par. 592; Utah Comp. Laws (1917)
par. 6781. Grace v. Hildebrandt (Okla. 1925) 237 Pac: 98, construing C. 0. S.(1921) § 532; Atkinson v. Crowe Coal & Mining Co. (1909) 80 Kan. 161, 102
Pac. 50, construing Gen. Stat. (1901) §4715. An admirable jury trial statute
is that of Connecticut, Gen. Stat. (1918) § 5752, in general requiring jury trial
in civil actions involving such an issue of fact as, prior to January 1, 1880,
would not present a question properly cognizable in equity. See also Rules
under Practice Act (1918) § § 175, 176, 235.
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defining ejectment in another section as an action to recover the imme-
diate possession of real property.14
The majority of courts have answered all our three questions
above in the negative. Hence if an equitable owner sues for the land
he is first told that he is not the real party in interest because ejectment
necessitates a legal title.'5 If he answers that he is not suing in eject-
ment he is told that he must be, because he is suing for the possession of
land.' And even assuming that he finds a trial court favorable to him
which tries the issues itself believing them of equitable cognizance his
judgment will be reversed on appeal because a jury trial is a matter
of right in ejectment. 17
This judicial viewpoint is obviously based on the idea that there
has been and can be no real union of law and equity, primarily because
a certain form of trial, the jury, is required in certain actions, law ac-
tions. The thesis of this paper is that there is and can be one civil
action, in which the issues, and not the similarity to some ancient
declaration, determine the mode of trial, the jury being necessary on
only such issues as were tried to it before the reform of procedure.
The real party in interest provision, as Professor Clark and the
writer have elsewhere endeavored to show,' 8 is simply the equitable
rule that "he who has the right is the person 'to pursue the remedy."'1
1 N. Y. C. P. A. § 425 and § 7.
'Percifull v. Platt (1880) 36 Ark. 456, where it is held that the real party
in interest provision (Gantt's Digest, § 2250) has done nothing more than
abolish the fictitious plaintiff in ejectment. See also Felger v. Coward (1868)
35 Calif. 650; Bailey v. Winn (1890) 101 Mo. 649.
For the rule in the common-law jurisdictions see Davis v. Boslic(1919) 125 Va. 698, 100 S. E. 463, where the court after holding that an equit-
able title will not support ejectment says: "This fundamental principle is too
well settled to call for the citation of additional authority to sustain or illus-
trate it."
The federal courts take the same view. See McGrew v. Byrd (C. C. A. 8th
1919) 257 Fed. 66, 67, where the court says, "That one cannot, in the national
court, recover lands in an action of ejectment on an equitable title only is well
settled .... And this rule prevails in the state of Missouri."
" McDonald v. Skinner (1925) 124 Misc. 545, 209 N. Y. Supp. 219; Schick v.
Wolf, supra, footnote 9, where it is said that plaintiff's action is ejectment
although he claims otherwise. Cf. Syracuse v. Hogan (1923) 254 N* Y. 457, 138
N. E. 406.7 In Rubin v. City of Syracuse (1925) 212 App. Div. 475, 203 N. Y. Supp.
732, the complaint alleged that plaintiffs owned and were possessed of realty
and that a pretended transfer to the defendant gave him no title but was a
cloud on plaintiff's title, and that defendant was threatening to eject plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs demanded peaceable possession, an injunction, and removal of any
structure erected by defendant. Held, defendant entitled to a jury trial since
he had raised an issue of fact by alleging ownership in himself, and under N. Y.
Real Prop. Law § § 502, 503, 504 as added by Laws 1920, c. 930, the trial on this
issue is like ejectment.
' Clark and Hutchins, The Real Party in Interest (1925) 34 Yale Law Journ.259. 29 First Report of the Commissioners on Practice and Pleadings (N. Y. 1848)
124.
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To find that a plaintiff is not the real party in interest, then, requires
a holding that he has no right of action.' To this conclusion in the equit-
able ejectment cases many courts have come. These are the words of
Peck v. Newton,20 an early New York case where tht vendee under a
land contract was seeking to secure possession of the property which he
had bought from one Parsons: "But this action being against a stranger
in possession, by the plaintiff, resting not on a legal but a mere equitable
title, I am unable to see on which principle he is entitled to recover....
Before the Code, what would have been the relative rights of these
parties? Clearly no action at law could have been maintained by the
plaintiff against the defendant. Neither can I see any ground on which
a suit in equity could have been maintained. The rights of the parties
to the alleged exchange must first have been settled by a court of equity
and a specific performance of that contract enforced against Parsons,...
before the plaintiff could have maintained any action against the de-
fendant. Even if this could have been accomplished in a single suit
by making the defendant a party to the suit against Parsons, for the
specific performance, still without a decree against Parsons, none could
have been had against the defendant. To allow the plaintiff to recover,
then, against the defendant, in this action would be admitting a new
cause of action which did not before exist, either at law or in equity
.... And if before the Code he could not have recovered, in any court,
upon such a cause of action as he here seeks to establish, he can not,
since the Code."
Dark as is the picture drawn by the learned judge, one ray of
light is indicated. It is suggested that perhaps the plaintiff could ob-
tain his land by suing the vendor and the defendant, receiving specific
performance from the vendor and possession from the defendant. But
even this hope is taken away by the case of McDonald v. Skinner"'
decided by the Supreme Court of New York last May. There the
plaintiff vendee joined his vendor and a subsequent vendee in a suit for
possession, damages, and other relief. The court held that an equitable
title would not support ejectment. 22
But had the equitable titleholder no right of action before the
codes? He could have sued his vendor for specific performance, and, as
incidental to that, delivery of possession. 23 This was a substantive (or
S(N'. Y. 1862) 46 Barb. 173, 175, 176.
'Supra, footnote 16.
' The case makes several other interesting statements, such as that plain-
tiff has an adequate remedy at law; and that damages are an adequate remedy
for violation of a contract to convey real estate.
' See Felger v. Coward, supra, footnote 15; Pomeroy, op. cit., footnote 10,
p. 60.
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at least a substantial) right. When now he asks that his vendor give
him possession, what is he asking but specific performance? Surely
the Code leaves this right intact. If it does, the plaintiff is the real
party in interest.
Before the Code, too, the plaintiff could have joined his vendor
and the occupier in a suit in equity.24 The chancery rules as to joinder
of parties now incorporated in the codes22 were intended to prevent
exactly what McDonald v. Skinner makes inevitable-multiplicity of
suits. By joinder the plaintiff could have obtained specific performance
against the vendor and possession from the other defendant; that is,
he bad a right of action against both defendants. This right also must
remain under the codes, enabling the equitable owner to sue the legal
owner and the occupier for possession as the real party in interest.20
The plaintiff's right of action, or in the words of Peck v. Newton,27
his cause of action, exists today precisely because it existed under the
old practice. To say he is not the real party in interest is to make
another action necessary; but there is nothing in modern practice
acts to show that a circuity of action which was easily escapable under
the earlier system is made inescapable by the reform of procedure. 2
It is interesting to note that the Appellate Division20 in a case contempo-
rary with Mcbonald v. Skinner on similar facts reached a decision
contrary to that case and in accord with the view here contended for
simply by using the catchword specific performance instead of the
catchword ejectment used in McDonald v. Skinner. That a mere vari-
ation in shibboleths should produce such diverse conclusions seems un-
fortunate. 0
The question in every case, according to the foregoing analysis, is
has the plaintiff any right of action which he could have enforced before
'Pomeroy, The Specific Performance of Contracts (2d ed. 1897) §493:
"All persons having or claiming an interest in the land derived from the vendor
after the contract and with notice thereof, are necessary defendants in a suit
brought by the vendee or his representatives."
See Goodnight v. Goar (1868) 30 Ind. 418; Hellams v. Switaer (1885) 24
S. C. 39; Voorhis v. Child's Ex'r (1858) 17 N. Y. 354. See also (1925) 34 Yale
Law Journ. 192; (1923) 32 Yale Law Journ. 384.
'It would seem that this joinder might now be required only at the request
of the plaintiff, since the purpose of it is to protect him. If he does not request
it, plaintiff might be permitted to sue the occupier alone, as suggested by
Pomeroy, loc. cit., footnote 23. But cf. Pomeroy, op. cit., footnote 10, p. 282.
Supra, footnote 20.
: The modern trend is certainly toward greater freedom of joinder of
parties. See especially the advances made by Civil Practice Act in New York.
But see the comments on these changes by Professor Hinton, An American
Experiment with English Rules of Court (1926) 20 Ill. Law Rev. 533.
"Klapp v. Dealey (3d Dept. 1925) 213 App. Div. 523, 211 N. Y. Supp. 22.
' See also Neal v. Baker (Ind. 1925) 147 N. E. 635, in which the plaintiff
by amending a complaint praying specific performance of a contract and calling
it a statutory action to quiet title was able to secure a jury trial.
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the codes? And if it is said that while the plaintiff may have a right of
action, he has not such right as may be enforced in ejectment, the
answer is that if this means the old action of ejectment there is no such
thing. Though issues remain, forms of action have disappeared. A
litigant is not now required to bother about them. He is forbidden to
plead law.3' He states his facts, and on the facts the issues are deter-
mined. On the facts he receives the judgment he is entitled to, no
matter what he calls his action or what he demands in his prayer for
relief.3 2
But it may be urged that the codes admit the existence of ejectment
by frequent mention of its name, and that they must mean something
by it. The question then is what is ejectment? It is not the ancient
action. That has been abolished. The codes say it is an action for the
possession of specific real property. What then is an action for specific
real property? Are bills for specific performance, cancellation, rescis-
sion, removal of cloud on title with possession, quieting title with pos-
session, injunction against interference with assumption of possession-
are all these ejectment in the sense of the New York Code because the
possession of specific real property is sought?
The learned reader may find the answer easy; the courts have not
found it so. Take three Oklahoma cases decided this year and last, in
which the Court had to tetermine what an action for the recovery of
possession was. In the first33 plaintiff asked a receiver, a declaration
that the defendant's claim was void, possession, an accounting, and
quieting of title. In the second34 the plaintiff demanded the rescission
of a fraudulent deed and possession. In the third35 the cross-petition
sought possession, cancellation, and an accounting. All these cases are
therefore in the lay sense of the term suits for the possession of specific
real property. But the court distinguished sharply among them, and
called two of them by that name, and the other merely an action for
the determination of a claim in real estate.30
Some courts have attempted to find a definite connotation for the
code word ejectment by stating that where.title is tried the action is
'Smith v. Dean (1853) 19 Mo. 63; Schofield v. Whitelegge (1872) 49 N'. Y.
259; Leach v. Rhodes (1874) 49 Ind. 291. See Clark, The Complaint in Code
Pleading (1926) 35 Yale Law Journ. 259.32Corry v. Gaynor (1871) 21 Ohio St. 277; Smith v. Smith (1903) 67 Kan.
841, 73 Pac. 56. But see Cobb v. Smith (1868) 23 Wis. 261. Professor Clark
discusses this matter at pp. 288 et seq. of the article cited, supra, footnote 31.
Halsell v. Beartail (Okla. 1924) 227 Pac. 392.
" Warner v. Coleman (Okla. 1924) 231 Pac. 1053.
' Grace v. Hildebrandt, supra, footnote 13.
" Warner v. Coleman, supra, footnote 34. See Rocha v. Rocha (Calif.
1925) 240 Pac. 1010, holding that an action to set aside and cancel a deed is one
of purely equitable cognizance, and that defendants did not make it a statutory
action to quiet title by praying that their title be quieted against plaintiff's claim.
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one for the possession of specific real property.37 In connection with
ejectment, however, the code speaks of possession, and not title. But
even waiving that point, we shall hardly find "title" more helpful than
"possession."
Equity could examine title under certain circumstances38 Our
courts, administering law and equity, may examine title under the same
circumstances. Our itiquiry should be not as to whether title is ex-
amined, but whether the facts of the case are such that the chancellor be-
fore the codes would have taken jurisdiction and granted complete re-
lief. If he would, there is no reason to suppose that modern judges
may not do the same thing. On this problem the word ejectment, in
view of the union of law and equity, sheds no light. Nor shall we ob-
tain much light from such vague expressions as "actions for possession,"
or "actions where title is tried."
If ejectment under the codes is not the action of say 1800, if "ac-
tion for possession" and "action to try title" do not give us a definition,
is it too much to conclude that in the code sense ejectment is not a
separate action at all? When the codes speak of ejectment they are
not putting back into modern procedure a form of action they have ex-
pressly erased; they are using a shorthand expression to cover the cases
where possession of realty is involved, including those admittedly equit-
able today. So that we can make no sweeping deductions reviving
forms of action from the mere use of the word. We must endeavor to
discover what the legislature had in mind in using it in a particular
statute.
The problem then is what did the legislature mean by using it or
its equivalent in the jury trial statute? Many judges have had a ready
solution. They have said: possession is the object of this action. An
action for possession is an action of ejectment. An action of ejectment
must be tried to the jury. Hence this action must be tried to the jury.
By some such avenue Judge Cardozo reached his conclusion in the
Susquehanna case, 39 decided this year. There the action was on a
written contract. The defense alleged that the contract was entered
into by mutual mistake, or by the fraud of the plaintiff and the
mistake of the defendant. The Civil Practice Act 40 provides that
issues of fact in an action in which the complaint demands judg-
'See e.g., Syracuse v. Hogan, supra, footnote 16; Atkinson v. Crowe Coal
& Mining Co., supra, footnote 12; Patchogue Land Corp. v. Long Island Comm.(1925) 213 N. Y. Supp. 12.
' E.g., in bills to remove cloud on title, to quiet title, and in cases where
the marketability of title is in question.




ment for a sum of money only must be tried by the jury. The court
held that this was an action for money only and that a jury trial was a
matter of right. This construction of the statute, said to be well settled,
assumes, as do the ejectment cases, that words mean exactly what they
say. We know that actually they never do. Their meaning is deter-
mined by the interpretation placed upon them. Taking the exact words
of the statute,41 can a plaintiff deprive the other party of a jury merely
by asking for something more than money? This would be contrary to
the general rule that when the defendant answers the prayer for relief
is immaterial.42 Are actions for accounting, 43 cancellation, 44 and fore-
closure 5 "equitable" merely because the demand for judgment men-
tions other incidental steps to the recovery of money? In almost all
commercial transactions which reach the courts, money is the object.
Is it possible that we determine which are tried to the jury merely by
asking whether or not any means of getting the money is suggested in
the complaint ?4  An over-simplified statement, such as that given in
the Susquehanna Case emphasizes the "delusive exactness '4 7 of the
codes. The statement seems splendid, until application of it is attempted.
Indeed the learned judge who wrote the opinion felt impelled to dis-
sent in Syracuse v. Hogan,4 s which held that ejectment meant eject-
ment. And it has been held in his jurisdiction that in an action to enjoin
a nuisance a jury is not needed,49 although the same section of the
" It should be noted that if the statute is taken literally it extends the
right to jury trial beyond its former limitation to actions at law. But as is
shown infra, the statute has not been literally construed except in a few cases.
'Supra, footnote 31.
'See Mandeville v. Avery (1889) 51 Hun 636, 3 N. Y. Supp. 745; Pen-
dergast v. Greenfield (1891) 127 N. Y. 23, 27 N. E. 388.
That there is no right to a jury trial on a creditor's bill, though of course
the action is in fact one for money only, see Murtha v. Curley (1882) 90 N. Y.
372; Bell v. Merrifield (1888) 109 N. Y. 202, 16 N. E. 55.
" See Moss v. Burnham (1st Dept. 1900) 50 App. Div. 301, 63 N. Y. Supp.
947. Cf. Imperial Shale Brick Co. v. Jewett (1901) 169 N. Y. 143, 62 N. E. 167,
an action to reform an insurance policy and recover on it as reformed.
' See Parker v. McGinty (Colo. 1925) 239 Pac. 10. Farmer's Nat. Bk. v.
Houston (N. Y. 1887) 44 Hun 567; Matter of Hamilton Park Co. (1st Dept.
1896) 1 App. Div. 375, 37 N. Y. Supp. 310.
' That in a suit in interpleader where rival claimants are demanding the
proceeds of an insurance policy the right to jury trial does not exist, see Union
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Broderick (Calif. 1925) 238 Pac. 1034.
"Clark, The Code Cause of Action (1924) 33 Yale Law Journ. 817.
,Supra, footnote 16.
"Cogswell v. N. Y. N. H. & H. R. R. (1887) 105 N. Y. 319, 11 N. E. 518.
Cf. (1925) 25 Columbia Law Rev. 641 supporting this view with (1925) 25
Columbia Law Rev. 630 supporting the Susquehanna Case. It would seem that
the two attitudes are inconsistent unless there should be a different form of trial
when the equitable issue is raised by the defendant, as in the Susquehanna Case,
from the form of trial when the issue is raised by the plaintiff, as in the Cogs-
well Case. The distinction, which is not mentioned in the jury trial statute,
seems rather too refined, and does not appear to have occurred to the courts.
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Practice Act on which he rests his decision in the Susquehanna case
expressly requires a jury in an action for a nuisance, 50
It is simpler to say that the words of the Civil Practice Act can-
not mean all they seem to mean. With that premise we are able to
begin a search for a workable rule. In the Susquehanna Case the plea
of mistake could, prior to the Code, have been raised only by a bill in
equity." If the court had denied a jury trial on that issue, it would
not have deprived the plaintiff of any constitutional right. '2  The Con-
stitution guarantees a jury on issues tried to it under the old system,
and no more. It is submitted that the only practicable test is the his-
torical test; that is, issues which were tried to the jury before the adop-
tion of the codes must be tried to the jury under the codes. Issues
formerly tried to the court are to be tried to the court today."
"Ejectment" and "action for the possession of specific real prop-
erty," as used in codes contain no inner radiance which can illumine the
requirement of jury trial. We cannot by saying this is ejectment, or
this is an action for the possession of land, provide ourselves with one
of the eternal verities. We must discover whether there is a question
which the jury would formerly have tried; if so, it must go to the jury
now. When, therefore, we find an equitable owner suing his vendor
for possession, we observe that this is something which the chancellor
would have tried, and deny a request for a jury. Where we find the
equitable owner suing a third party in possession, we allow him to join
the legal owner and sue them both without a jury; for this is what
would have happened before the codes.
Any other result leads to confusion as to terminology, with con-
sequent confusion in the decisions. To be on the safe side courts will
name every action "legal" or "ejectment" and call in a jury, 4 thus
adding to the taxpayers' burdens. The real party in interest clause,
"' The Calif. Code (1923) par. 592, which states in effect that in an action for
the recovery of real or personal property or for money claimed on contract an
issue of fact must be tried by the jury has been construed to permit trial of
equitable defenses in such actions to the court. See Swasey v. Adair (1891) 88
Calif. 179, 25 Pac. 1119.
See also Kimball v. McIntyre (1881) 3 Utah 77, 1 Pac. 167, construing the
statute which is now Utah Comp. Laws (1917) par. 6781.
Apparently but few states have taken the view of the jury trial statute as
to equitable defenses now announced in New York. Two only seem in entire
accord with New York as to the meaning of the statute. See King v. Inter-
nat. Lumber Co. (Minn. 1923) 195 N. W. 450; Citizens Trust Co. v. Going (1921)
288 Mo. 505, 232 S. W. 996.
" See (1925) 25 Columbia Law Rev. 630, 634, note 26.
"
2Ibid. N. Y. Const. Art. 1, § 2. See also Clark, op. cit., footnote 10, p. 7.
Clark, Union *of Law and Equity and Trial by Jury under the Codes
(1923) 32 Yale Law Journ. 707, 709.
"This procedure seems to be impliedly recommended as to equitable defenses
by the learned writer of the comment in (1925) 25 Columbia Law Rev. 630.
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the establishment of one form of civil action, the liberal provisions as
to joinder of parties, all indicate the desire of the codifiers to bring
the person with the substantive right before the court and settle his
claims against everyone in one proceeding. Ambiguous provisions re-
garding trial by jury too broadly construed and applied indiscriminately
to actions rather than issues wherever the possession of land is men-
tioned can only add to the law's delays and to the already too numerous
departures from the spirit of code pleading.5
Our conclusion is then that when the equitable owner comes into
court demanding possession the answer to be made him cannot be found
in any mystic words, such as equitable ejectment, but is rather to be
discovered by inquiring whether before the codes he had any substan-
tive right, if not at law, then in equity, the form of trial on the issues
found remaining as it was under the old regime.
ROBERT M. HUTCHINS
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' Costigan, The Spirit of Code Pleading (1917) 11 Ill. Law Rev. 517.
